Montana Law Review
Volume 34
Issue 1 Winter 1973

Article 12

1-1-1973

State v. Brecht: Evolution or Offshoot of the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule?
W. Bjarne Johnson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
W. Bjarne Johnson, State v. Brecht: Evolution or Offshoot of the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule?, 34
Mont. L. Rev. (1973).
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol34/iss1/12

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Johnson: State v. Brecht:
Evolution
Or Offshoot
Of The Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule?
STATE
V. BRECHT:
EVOLUTION
OR OFFSHOOT
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
W. Bjarne Johnson
POINT OF DEPARTURE
THE EXCULUSIONARY RULE

State v. Brecht,' a recent Montana decision applying the federal
fourth amendment exclusionary rule, signals a fundamental change in
the application of that rule in Montana. Brecht represents not only
a break with previous Montana applications of the rule, but with the
very basis of the rule itself. The purpose of this note will be to explore
the changes wrought by this decision, and their possible ramifications.
The exclusionary rule, requiring the exclusion in criminal prosecutions of all evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's fourth
amendment right to be free from illegal searches and seizures, 2 is a
constitutionally derived, judicially implied rule of evidence. Originally
imposed only on criminal prosecutions in the federal courts,3 it has
since been held to apply to state court proceedings as well through the
4
fourteenth amendment.
SYNOPSIS OF THE DECISION

The defendant was tried for the murder of his wife, and was found
guilty of second degree murder. At the trial, the sister of the deceased
testified to certain threats she overheard the defendant make. She
overheard these threats while listening surreptitiously on an extension
telephone in her home. It was the admission of this testimony that the
court found to be reversible error. The relevant portions of the decision
are as follows:
We hold that the admission of Sandra Blumfield's testimony concerning the telephone conversation . . . which she overhead while
listening on the extension phone, constitutes prejudicial and reversible

error. Admission of this testimony violated the defendant's fourth
amendment rights under the federal constitution as applied to
state court criminal proceedings under the "due process" clause of
the fourteenth amendment. It equally violated the defendant's rights
under Article III, Sec. 7 of the Montana Constitution.'
The state at this point contended that the constitutional proscriptions
against invasions of a person's right of privacy as guaranteed under
the fourth amendment applied solely to government action, and not
to private action such as occurred here. The court answered:
'State v. Breeht, ...... Mont.......

485 P.2d 47 (1971).

*C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK or THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 364 (2d ed. 1972)
cited as MCCORMICK].

[hereinafter

'Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
'Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 647, 655 (1961).
"State v. Brecht, supra note 1 at 50.
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We think not. The violation of the constitutional right to privacy
and against compulsory self-incrimination is as detrimental to the
person to whom the protection is guaranteed in the one case as in
the other. To distinguish between
classes of citizens is tantamount
to destruction of the right itself.6
This Court in the present case would be remiss were it not to recognize that evidence obtained by the unlawful or unreasonable invasion
of several of the constitutionally protected rights guaranteed to its
citizens by both the federal and Montana constitutions properly
comes within the contemplation of this Court's exclusionary rule.
To do otherwise would lend Court approval to a fictional distinction
between classes of citizens: those who are bound to respect the Constitution and those who are not. Were the exclusionary rule to
recognize such distinctions it would by indirection circumvent the
rule established by this Court to enforce these rights and would in
fact render the rule and the constitutional guarantees it protects
meaningless.'

This decision is interesting for a number of reasons. It is clearly
contrary to existing state and federal law on the subject. It treats
the fourth amendment guarantees of freedom from illegal searches and
seizures and invasions of privacy as extending to include private action
as well as state action. And finally, it applies the rule in a manner that
is inconsistent with the rule's basic tenets.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE-DEVELOPMENT AND PURPOSE
THE DILEMMA

The exclusionary rule is not a completely satisfactory rule. Rather,
it represents the attempts of many courts to solve a problem that defies
simple solution. The very core of the problem devolves from conflicting
policy considerations. Balanced against the interest society has in prosecuting and eliminating criminal activities is the interest in prohibiting law
enforcement personnel from violating the fourth amendment proscription
against illegal searches and seizures, a proscription which has been
extended to invasions of privacy as well.8 The exclusionary rule was
promulgated specifically to enforce that proscription, 9 by removing the
incentive for officers to violate it.
As might be expected of a rule that directly benefits only the
criminal and provides no direct sanction against the person breaking
it, the rule has not received warm judicial 0 or academic" approval. Use
of the rule has been likened to the "fox hunting" approach to law enforcement, where the emphasis is more on the rules of the chase than
the object of it. 2 And, as is pointed out by McCormick, the danger
inhering in such an approach is that a single police officer may, by
6
Id. at 51.
7Id.

'Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
"Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 4 at 658.
People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).

1

18 J. WIMOE, THE LAW Op EVIDENCE § 2184 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE].
"Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S.
255, 256 (1961).
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his misconduct, effectively confer immunity upon a defendant.
courts,
and
federal
state
decision to apply the exclusionary rule, in both
represents the culmination of seventy-five years of judicial threshing
of the problem of securing official respect for the fourth amendment
guarantees of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures and invasions of privacy.' 4 Courts found themselves compelled to apply the
rule because all the other remedies, such as criminal or tort remedies,
had "completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers."' 15 It was for that reason that the
United States Supreme6 Court made the rule binding on the state as well
as the federal courts.1

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RuLE

There is no basis for the exclusionary rule in either the common
law or the early period of American constitutional law. The admissibility
of evidence was never questioned on the grounds that it might have
been improperly obtained. 1" Not only was there an understandable reluctance to disregard valuable evidence, but it was thought that the
source of the evidence was a separate question, and not properly an
issue in the trial of the defendant.'
The constitutional basis for the rule has its roots in Boyd v. United
States.' 9 Noting that the fourth and fifth amendments were very closely
tied, in that the "unreasonable searches and seizures condemned in the
fourth amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling
a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the fifth amendment, ' 20 the Court stated that "[I]n this
'2
regard the fourth and fifth amendments run almost into each other." '
The Court ruled that the principles of these amendments "apply to all
invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity
of a man's home and the privacies of life."'22 Though the case eventually
turned on the fifth amendment, the admission of evidence obtained in
violation of these amendments was specifically termed "unconstitu'23
tional.
Stating flatly that "conviction by means of unlawful seizures
should find no sanction in the judgments of the court, '24 Weeks v. United
States was the first case to bar evidence obtained through illegal search
and seizure. The Court said that the fourth amendment "put the courts
sMcORmIcK, supra note 2 at 367.
"'From Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) to Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 4.
5People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 911-912 (1955).
'87Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 4 at 655.
1 McCORmICK, supra note 2 at 365; 8 WiomoRR, supra note 11 at § 2185.
supra note 11 at § 2185.
B8 WiomoR,
'OBoyd v. United States, supra note 14.
wId. at 633.
aId. at 630.
2Id.
2Id. at 638.
"Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
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of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power
and authority, under limitations and restraints." Furthermore, the "duty
of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under
our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. 2 5 The Court
reasoned that the evidence should not be admissible, for if "letters and
private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures
is of no value. '26 The Weeks decision was actually quite limited in
scope. The Court said that the fourth amendment "is not directed to
individual misconduct of state officers. Its limitations reach the Federal
Government and its agencies. '"2 T Still it marked a tremendous change
by declaring in effect that the "Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or limiting the use of evidence in court, really forbade its introduction if obtained by government officers through a violation of the
28
amendment."
The Weeks ruling was broadened thirteen years later in Byars v. United
States.29 Though not directly ruling on the effect of the fourth amendment on the states, the Court held that evidence illegally seized in a
joint operation between state and federal officers must be excluded, as
the "effect is the same as though [the federal agent] had engaged in
'30
the undertaking as one exclusively his own."
It was not until Wolf v. Colorado31 that the Supreme Court dealt
with the fourth amendment and its effect on the individual states. The
Court held that the "security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is . . .
implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty', . . . and as such enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause. '3 2 Having reached
that decision, however, the Court did not take what would appear to be a
logical next step, and declare that evidence seized illegally by state
officers had to be excluded from state proceedings as well.
Though the Court said that it would "have no hesitation in saying
that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into
privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment, '33 it did not require the state courts to exclude evidence obtained
by such incursions. Two reasons were given for not imposing the exclusionary rule on the states at that point. The reasons were of a basically practical, not constitutional, nature. One reason was that "other
Uld.
RId. at 392.
-Id. at 398.
"Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928).
'Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927).
8Id.
"mWolf v. Colorado, supra note 3 at 27-28.
"Id.
93Id.
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means of protection" were available to the state courts to enforce the
right to privacy ;84 and the other reason was that the Court did not care
to overturn the states' established rules of evidence.8 5 These reasons
would not prove to be lasting.
A California decision, People v. Cahan,3 6 was both prophetic and persuasive in its adoption of the exclusionary rule in 1955. That court
found itself
...compelled to apply the rule because other remedies have completely failed to secure the compliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with the attendant result that
the courts under the old rule have been constantly required to
participate in, and in effect, condone, the lawless activities of law
enforcement officers.'
Cahan found the exclusionary rule to be the only satisfactory method
of curbing police conduct, as "a system that permits the prosecution
to trust habitually to the use of illegally obtained evidence cannot help
but encourage violations of the constitution at the expense of lawful
means of enforcing the law." 38
That the function of the rule was to sanction police misconduct
and to prevent further occurrences of illegal searches and seizures became very apparent in Elkins v. United States.3 9 Weeks, it will be re,
membered, did not require the exclusion of any evidence except that
seized illegally by federal officers. 40 A predictable outgrowth of that
ruling was that prosecutors simply used evidence obtained illegally by
state officers in a federal criminal trial. This was permissible under what
became known as the "silver platter" doctrine, a doctrine which allowed
the use of such evidence simply because no federal agent had participated
in the illegal search and seizure. 41 Amazingly, this rather uncommendable cooperation continued for some thirty-five years without question. 42
Elkins ended the practice by ruling inadmissible in federal criminal trials
any "evidence obtained by state officers during a search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amend43
ment."
After the Elkins decision, 44 there existed only one "courtroom door
remaining open to evidence secured by means of illegal searches and
"Id. at 30.
85i. at 31-32.

"People v. Cahan, supra note 15.

61d. at 911.
MId. at 914.
'Elkins v. Unted States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
"Weeks v. United States, supra note 24 at 398.
IlMcCoutmIcK, supra note 2 at 372.
"Byars v. United States, supra note 29 at 33.
"Elkins v. United States, supra note 39 at 223.
"Id.
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seizures."' 4 5 In Mapp v. Ohio46 it was decided to close that door as well.
The Court decided that the reasons it had not extended the exclusionary
rule to the states in Wolf 47 were no longer valid. "Since the Fourth
Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth," by virtue of
the Wolf decision, the Court held that "it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Govern48
ment.
SUMMARY OF THE RULE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

With the Mapp decision ruling that the exclusionary rule was within
the rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment, some conclusions about
the fundamental purposes of the rule may now be made. The "basic
postulate" of the rule was stated somewhat earlier in Elkins v. United
States. "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is
to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."'49
The rule is prospective in operation, and was imposed as being the only
effective means of deterring illegal police activity.50 In emphasizing
this aspect, the Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker refused to apply
the decision in Mapp retrospectively. Noting that the rule's function was
deterrent in nature, the Court did not see how "this purpose would be
advanced by making the rule retrospective. The misconduct of the
police prior to Mapp has already occurred and will not be corrected by
releasing the prisoners involved." 51
LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
THE EXCULSIONARY RULE AND THE WRONGFUL ACTS OF PRIVATE CITZENS

In deciding that Sandra Blumfield's testimony was inadmissible
52
because obtained in violation of Brecht's fourth amendment rights,
the court in Brecht relied on the standard set in Katz v. United States.,,
The Brecht decision stated that Katz ."established the principle that the
'search and seizure provisions' of the Fourth Amendment . . . protects
[sic] persons and their right to privacy and is not confined to trespass
against property rights. 5 4 In Katz, the United States Supreme Court
faced the question of whether evidence the police secured by attaching a listening device to the outside of a telephone booth would be

"'Id.at 224.

46Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 4 at 655.
"'Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 3.
'IMapp v. Ohio, supra note 4 at 655.
10Elkins v. United States, supra note 39 at 220.
OMapp v. Ohio, supra note 4 at 655.
n'Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
nState v. Brecht, supra note 1 at 50.
"Katz v. United States, supra note 8.
"State v. Brecht, supra note 1 at 50.
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admissible. The Court held it was not. It held that physical trespass
was not necessary for a violation, because the fourth amendment "protects people, not places." 55 In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan
stated that the fourth amendment extends to protect an individual from
governmental intrusion wherever he has a reasonable "expectation of
privacy." 56
Though the state contended in Brecht that the proscriptions mentioned in Katz applied only to intrusions of government officers, and
not to the acts of private persons, the court thought not. It stated that
the "violation of the constitutional right to privacy is as detrimental to
the person to whom the protection is guaranteed in the one case as in
the other. '57 Katz itself, though, suggests that conduct of a private individual does not come within the proscriptions of the fourth amendment.
[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual

privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion. .

.

. Other

provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other
forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of a persons
general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other peopleis like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely
to the law of the individual states.'
And in fact, until Brecht, the courts generally had not applied the
exclusionary rule in criminal cases to evidence uncovered by the wrongful acts of a private citizen.5 9 The rule was developed with two very
specific goals in mind. One goal was to retain a certain "judicial integrity."6 0 The other goal was to deter lawless official conduct. 61 As
might be suspected of a rule that was developed with specific goals in
mind, the exclusionary rule has not proven susceptible to a procrustean
application to every invasion of privacy. Even the United States Su-

'Katz v. United States, supra note 8 at 351.

1Id. at 361.
'State v. Brecht, supra note 1 at 50-51.
'Katz v. United States, supra note 8 at 350-351. However, in the opinion of Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 485 (1965), Justice Douglas suggests that the
''specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights have penubras'' covering the various facets
of the right of privacy. In light of the number of opinions in that case, though, the
Court can hardly be said to be in agreement on this point.
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Duran v. United States, 413 F.2d 596
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 917; Watson v. United States, 391 F.2d 927
(5th Cir. 1968), cert. den. 393 U.S. 985; United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d 306
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. den. 389 U.S. 1053; Barnes v. United States, 373 F.2d 517
(5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3rd Cir. 1964), cert. den.
377 U.S. 953; Geniviva v. Bingler, 206 F.Supp. 81 (D. Penn. 1961); Miromontes v.
Superior Court for County of San Mateo, 25 Cal.App.3rd 877, 102 Cal. Rptr. 182
(1972) ; Stapleton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 70 Cal.2d 97, 73 Cal.Rptr.
575, 447 P.2d 967 (1969); People v. Katzman, 258 Cal.App.2d 777, 66 Cal.Rptr. 318
(1968); People v. Botts, 250 Cal.App.2d 478, 58 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1967); People v.
Wright, 245 Cal.App.2d 265, 53 Cal.Rptr. 844 (1966); People v. Potter, 240 Cal.App.2d
621, 49 Cal. Rptr. 892, cert. den. 388 U.S. 924, reh. den. 389 U.S. 890 (1966);
People v. Johnson, 153 Cal.App.2d 870, 315 P.2d 468 (1957); People v. Torres, 49
Misc.2d 39, 266 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1966).
Contra: State v. Brecht, supra note 1.

O'Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968).
Inid.
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preme Court has recognized the limitations of the rule that it imposed.
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court said that "a rigid and unthinking application
of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which it can
never be used effectively to control, may exact a high toll in human
injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime." 62
As a general rule, then, both "federal and state courts have almost
uniformly held that evidence obtained by private individuals pursuant
to activities which, if performed by governmental agents, would conIstitute a violation of Fourth Amendment rights, is nevertheless admissible." 63 The reasons courts have advanced for not applying the rule
to other than governmental violations rest fundamentally on two bases.
One is that the courts find themselves reluctant to extend fourth amendment protection beyond its long established limits. Viewing the fourth
amendment only as a limitation of government authority, the courts have
found that an invasion of an individual's rights by one other than a
government official is not within the protection of the amendment."
The other reason is based on the objectives sought to be reached by the
rule. As the rule's function primarily has been to deter official lawlessness, 65 that purpose could not be served by excluding evidence obtained
solely by an individual acting for himself. 66
THm CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

The leading case on the admissibility of evidence obtained illegally
by a private citizen 7 is Burdeau v. McDowell.68 In reversing the trial
court's suppression of evidence seized illegally by a private individual,
the Court held that the protection of the fourth amendment applies
only to governmental action. The Court said that the origin and history
of the fourth amendment "clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended
as a limitation upon other than governmental agencies." 69 Since the
evidence in question had come into the government's possession without
violation of fourth amendment rights by anyone connected with the
70
government, it was held to be admissible.
Even though the exclusionary rule has been greatly expanded since
1921 when Burdeau was decided, it "has not been expanded to the extent
that evidence obtained by persons not acting in concert with either state
or federal officials must be excluded. 7 1 This still remains true. Even

OId. at 15.
OMcCormick, supra note 2 at 372.
"Burdeau v. McDowell, supra note 59 at 475.
1Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 4 at 655; People v. Cahan, supra note 15 at 912.
6People v. Johnson, supra note 59 at 472-473.
"McCormick, supra note 2 at 371.
"Burdeau v. McDowell, supra note 59.
/
Gid. at 475.
701d. at 476.
nGeniviva v. Bingler, supra note 59 at 83.
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very current state72 and federal7 3 authorities retain the rule that the
fourth amendment applies only to official action, and refuse to exclude
evidence wrongfully obtained by a private individual.
74
The two earliest Montana cases, State ex rel. Samlin v. DistrictCourt
5
and State ex rel. King v. District Court7 wherein evidence was suppressed for having been illegally obtained were cited in the Brecht
decision. The language of these cases gives no indication of departing
from the normal boundaries of the exclusionary rule. In Samlin it was
held that the Montana counterpart to the fourth amendment, article III,
§ 7, was "expressive of the same fundamental principles," and that
furthermore, it "was intended to be equally as effective to prevent an
invasion of the rights of the citizen under the guise of law by the state
government or any of its officers. ' 76 Accordingly, the court followed
the Weeks example and ordered the evidence be suppressed. 77 King holds
similarly, stating that article III, § 7, is substantially a "reiteration of
the Fourth Amendment," and that its purpose is also to "protect the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures . . . by authority of
the government. '78 A later case, and one which was not cited in Brecht,
stated that the constitutional safeguards against unreasonable searches
and seizures "can only be invoked . . . to protect a citizen against the
activities of the government." 79 The court then continued to say that
it "is only when persons are acting under color of authority from the
government that evidence developed in violation of the law can be at
all rejected."8' 0
THE

FUNCTIONAL BASIS

The exclusionary rule was finally imposed because experience had
taught the courts that it was the only effective method of curbing
official misconduct."' As it directly benefits only the criminal on trial,
though, there would be very little to recommend the rule once it ceases
to perform this function. Logic indicates that certain requirements must

"Supra note 59.
tId.
74
State ex rel. Samlin v. District Court, 59 Mont. 600, 198 P. 362 (1921).
'"State ex rel. King v. District Court, 70 Mont. 191, 224 P. 862 (1924).
'State ex rel. Samlin v. District Court, supra note 74 at 365.
7Id.
at 367. It is interesting to note that the court not only ordered the evidence suppressed, but ordered the illegal liquor be returned to Samlin. If the logic of this decision defies explanation, so does the legality. Samlin was decided on May 6, 1921.
On March 22, 1921, § 23, Ch. 9 of Ex. L. 1921 was passed by the Montana legislature.
It states: ''It shall be unlawful to have or possess any liquor . . . and no property
right shall exist in any such liquor .... " (Codified as Revised Codes of Montana
1921, § 11070). It should also be noted that John Samlin was not the only fortunate
defendant. Similar decisions were handed down in State ex rel. Hogue v. O'Brien,
60 Mont. 178, 198 P. 1117 (1921) (decided May 23, 1921); and in State ex rel. Goodwin v. Dishman, 61 Mont. 117, 201 P. 286 (1921) (decided on October 7, 1921). This
practice of returning the liquor to the defendant was finally stopped some three years
later in State. e ret. King v. District Court, 70 Mont. 191, 224 P. 862, 866 (1924).
"State ex rel. King v. District Court, supra note 75 at 864.
'State en rel. Sadler v. District Court, 70 Mont. 378, 225 P. 1000, 1003, (1924).
'Old.
"Terry v. Ohio, supra note 60 at 12-13; Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 4 at 655.
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be met if the rule is in fact going to fulfill its deterrent function. For
one thing, the person committing the search and seizure must have an
interest in obtaining a conviction with the information he secures. Obviously the rule is of no value where, for example, the police have "no
interest in prosecuting, or are willing to forego successful prosecution
in the interest of serving another goal."'8 2 This would be especially true
in situations such as Brecht, in which the person obtaining the evidence
did so without any intent of securing evidence to be used in a prosecu83
tion.
The other requirement, which on the surface seems elemental, is that
the person involved in the search and seizure must at least be aware of
the rule.8 4 While it is not unusual to expect the police to be familiar
with certain salient rules of evidence, it does seem unlikely that a layman with no interest or intent of securing the conviction of criminals
would have much knowledge in this area. Certainly, Sandra Blumfield
did not have, nor could she reasonably be expected to have, this knowledge.
California faced squarely this question of whether to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained illegally by a private citizen in
3
Two years previous to this case, in People v. Cahan,
People v. Johnson."
the California supreme court had imposed the exclusionary rule in California as being the only method of securing police compliance with constitutional provisions.8 " In Johnson, the court decided that the exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence obtained by a private person who was
87
It so
not associated with any sort of governmental unit or agency.
decided by saying that the situation before it was not even "remotely
close to the situation sought to be cured by the rule of evidence established [in People v. Cahan] to stop police from rampant, violent, illegal
8' 8
and unreasonable searches and seizures.
THE SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED ILLEGALLY BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS

The admissibility of evidence unlawfully secured by private individuals might be regarded as merely an extension of the "silver platter"
doctrine struck down in Elkins.8 9 However, the courts have not so regarded it 0 In United States v. McGuire,9 though the Court did not
have to reach the issue, it did make special mention of the effect of
Elkins, on the admissibility of evidence from private individuals covered
"Terry v. Ohio, supra note 60 at 14.
'State v. Brecht, supra note 1 at 50.
'People v. Botts, 250 Cal.App.2d 478, 58 Cal.Rptr. 412, 415-416 (1967).
'5People v. Johnson, supra note 59 at 468.
MPeople v. Cahan, supra note 15 at 911.
OePeople v. Johnson, supra note 59 at 469.
8Id. at 472-473.
kins v. United States, supra note 39.
90United States v. MeGuire, supra note 59 at 313.
921d.
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in Burdeau. In finding that the weight of the authority had left "Burdeau
unimpaired by Elkins," the Court stated that the "thrust of the Fourth
'2
Amendment is to assure protection from official, not private intrusion."
This creates less of a problem than might be imagined, and does
not foster the sort of cooperation between police and private citizens
that one might expect. The cooperation is not fostered because it is
not rewarded. As soon as a private individual acts in association or cooperation with the police, the courts have held that his act is deemed to
be the act of the state 3 Not only will evidence be excluded if a private
individual works at the direction or supervision of the police,9 4 but it
will also be excluded when the police are guilty of no more than just
"idly standing by."9 5 Montana foreclosed the possibility of this type of
cooperation as far back as 1924. In State ex rel. Sadler v. District Court 6
the court ruled inadmissible evidence that was illegally seized by two
private investigators hired by the Cascade County Attorney.
CONCLUSION
This overview of the development and purpose of the exclusionary
rule indicates that it is not an appropriate remedy for the unlawful
acts of private citizens. In so ruling, it appears that the Montana court
has engaged in a bit of judicial pioneering that has resulted in a unique
application of the rule. As applied in Brecht, the rule is incapable of fulfilling its prime function of deterring unlawful official conduct. As a
private citizen is likely neither to know of the rule nor to be greatly
interested in obtaining criminal convictions, his situation appears to be
beyond the scope of the rule. The result of applying the rule to cases
such as Brecht can only be "to free a guilty man without any assurance
that there would result any counterbalancing restraint of similar conduct
'9 7
in the future.

92Id.
wMiramontes v. Superior Court for County of San Mateo, supra note 59 at 189; Stapleton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, supra note 59 at 969; People v. Tarrantino, 45 Cal.2d 590, 290 P.2d 505, 509 (1955).
"People v. Tarrantino, supra note 93 at 509.
"Stapleton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, supra note 59 at 970.
"State ex rel. Sadler v. District Court, supra note 79 at 1003.
G'People v. Botts, supra note 59 at 416.
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